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Abstract
This paper analyzes a mechanism for clearing a
physical market for intra-day schedules of receipts and
deliveries of a natural gas pipeline.
The Gas
Balancing Market (GBM) is implemented to trade
deviations from previously confirmed ratable
nominations by solving a rolling horizon model
predictive control (MPC) optimization formulation.
The GBM mechanism operates by accepting
quantity/price offers and bids from sellers and buyers
of gas and producing an economically optimal
schedule while guaranteeing its physical feasibility.
The GBM’s solution engine is based on a strict
mathematical representation of engineering factors of
transient pipeline hydraulics and compressor station
operations.
The GBM’s settlement of cleared
transactions is based on Locational Trade Values
(LTVs) of natural gas that are fully consistent with the
physics of energy flow. In this paper we provide
numerical results of simulating a hypothetical GBM
market operation using historical SCADA data for an
actual pipeline system operation during the Polar
Vortex period of February – March 2014. Based on
these simulations, we quantify the potential
deliverability and economic benefits of the GBM
utilizing transient optimization of pipeline operations.

1. Introduction
The growing reliance of the bulk electric power
system on gas-fired generation has increased the need
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to improve the coordination between the wholesale
natural gas and electricity markets.
Replacement of coal fired and nuclear plants with
gas-fired generating capacity significantly increases the
amount of natural gas used as fuel for power
generation. At the same time, the volatility of electric
generation delivered from wind and solar increases the
variability of pipeline deliveries to match the demand
of gas-fired generators used to balance the electric grid.
The resulting intra-day and even sub-hourly demand
swings for natural gas to fuel for electric generation
create new challenges for pipeline operators, and may
pose reliability risks for both gas pipelines and electric
systems.
The need to better coordinate both sectors to
mitigate these risks is well recognized and is
specifically reflected in Orders 787 and 809 of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that
regulates access to pipeline capacity [1,2].
Coordination mechanisms proposed to date are based
on widening the scope of operational information
exchanges between the two sectors, and on adjusting
the timing of these exchanges [3]. While these
measures are helpful, a truly efficient coordination
should be based on timely exchange of both physical
and pricing data, with price formation in both markets
being fully consistent with the physics of energy flow.
Electricity prices consistent with the physical
power flows on the grid are the outcome of economic
optimization of power system operation in electricity
markets administered by Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs) [4, 5]. A similar optimization
approach that accounts for physical and engineering
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factors of gas pipeline and compressor station
operations would lead to location and time dependent
economic valuation of natural gas consistent with the
physics of gas flow. Such an approach has been
formulated in [6] under the simplified assumption of
steady state pipeline flows.
A more general formulation would consider a truly
dynamic transient flow of natural gas, which is
essential for representing gas flow dynamics in time
frames of the same order of physical changes that
occur on the power grid. The problem formulation can
be described as a model predictive control (MPC)
approach, which uses a forecast of system conditions
and other time-dependent inputs to optimize pipeline
flows over a given time-horizon, such as 24 hours.
This paper relies on [8, 14]. Ref. [8] defines a
transient pipeline optimization problem that maximizes
total market surplus over supply and offtake schedules.
The market surplus in defined within the context of
Gas Balancing Market [14]. Market Surplus is defined
as the sum of the producer/supplier surplus and
consumer/buyer surplus. Producer surplus is the
difference between the revenue the producer obtains in
the market and the minimum value the producer is
willing to accept for the goods sold. Similarly,
consumer surplus is the difference between the
maximum price the consumer is willing to pay for a
good and the price the consumer ends up paying for it.
Market surplus is the sum of individual surpluses over
all
consumers/buyers
and
producers/sellers
participating in the market.
The appropriate transient optimization solution
dynamically allocates pipeline capacity among
transactions between suppliers and consumers based on
the economic value of these transactions. Compressor
operations and line pack are optimized in conjunction
with the selection of location-dependent offers to sell,
and bids to buy natural gas. Location based (nodal)
prices of natural gas are computed as dual variables
corresponding to the nodal flow balance constraints in
the optimal solution and reflect the time and location
dependent economic value of gas in the network.
In this paper we demonstrate the capability to
operate a pipeline system in practice using the Gas
Balancing Market (GBM) introduced in [14] through a
case study of a section of a pipeline subsystem in the
United States using network data obtained from a
capacity planning model as well as physical
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
system data and historical market information during a
period of highly congested conditions.
We
demonstrate that using our proposed formulation it is
possible to significantly increase pipeline throughput
with the added benefit of more efficient prices
throughout the system.
Both advantages are

demonstrated with respect to historical data on physical
and market conditions. In addition to quantifying the
economic benefits of the proposed mechanism, we
demonstrate the potential to use the modeling tool in
analysis and planning of wholesale electricity markets
with high reliance on natural gas.
This is the first paper to present an analysis of the
operation of the natural gas market design based on
transient optimization of a pipeline network utilizing
real system data. In addition to incorporating actual
physical data we developed a set of economic inputs
based on actual economic information and on
assumptions made to compensate for the lack of data
needed to model the behavior of market participants.
To place simulation results into an appropriate
context, Section 2 restates the motivation and key
principles underlying the proposed Gas Balancing
Market (GBM).
Section 3 provides and details of the computational
case study using real data, Section 4 provides analysis
of simulation results and discusses some policy
implications.
Section 5 contains a summary of
conclusions.

2. Gas Balancing Market
2.1. Motivation
Electric and natural gas networks follow distinct
but inter-related decision processes for scheduling their
operations. As discussed in [14], there exists a highly
intricate succession of decision cycles on both the
electric side and natural gas side. A gas-fired
generating unit considering operating the next electric
day (which begins at midnight) should submit an offer
to the Day-Ahead power market on the prior day by
10:30 AM Eastern Time. Prior to that, the asset
manager for the generating unit would procure gas
supply and delivery. Because electric generators
usually do not have firm supply contracts on the
pipeline, delivery to a pipeline receipt point will be
arranged at a bilaterally negotiated price. Shipment of
gas from the receipt point to the delivery point on the
pipeline could be arranged on a firm basis through the
capacity release mechanism or on a non-firm basis by
obtaining interruptible capacity. This process yields a
preliminary supply arrangement and gas prices. These
prices, although not backed up by delivery guarantees,
inform electric generators on how to bid in the dayahead (DA) electricity market. This process exposes
transacting parties to various kinds of risk.
Once the DA market clears and the financially
binding operational schedules for electric generators
are determined, generators have just enough time to
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make delivery nominations with the pipeline for the
next gas day. If the nominations are confirmed in the
Timely and/or Evening gas scheduling cycles, daily
delivery quantities are essentially guaranteed.
However, even if confirmed, the quantities needed by
the generator may be different from those preliminarily
arranged and the difference must be settled between
the parties.
If deliveries needed by the generator are not
confirmed due to pipeline capacity limitations,
generators would face significant financial exposure
when they are obligated to deliver power but have no
gas to produce it. This financial exposure is two-fold:
the generator may need to acquire replacement power
in the real-time market and also may be facing nonperformance penalties if the electric replacement
power purchase occurs at a time of scarcity.
Even if the daily delivery quantity is confirmed, the
pipeline typically expects that gas will be taken in
equal quantities each hour of the gas day (i.e., a
“ratable” quantity). Generators, however, typically
need non-ratable quantities which pipelines may be
able to accommodate but cannot guarantee.
Furthermore, most fast-start combined cycle
generators and gas turbine peaking facilities are not
committed in the DA market. Instead those units are
typically scheduled through the hourly reliability
updates or close to the real-time market. These “lastminute” decisions do not fit into the existing decision
cycles on the gas side. For these generators that are
critical for maintaining a reliable electric service and
providing essential ancillary services there is no
transparent mechanism on the gas side under which
they can purchase gas and schedule delivery as needed.
Sudden ramps required by these generators may cause
operational problems to the pipelines.
If these
generators receive no gas, this would jeopardize the
operational reliability of the electrical grid, while
delivering gas to these units may jeopardize the
reliability of the pipeline system.
We propose to solve these problems through the
formation of the hour-by-hour natural gas balancing
market (GBM) that would allow market participants to
trade deviations from approved ratable schedules
throughout the Timely and Evening Cycles.
These deviations could be traded through the
formal optimization-based auction type market
mechanisms described in the next section. Such an
auction could be run on an hourly basis using a rolling
horizon approach, such that each hour the auction
would optimize the system for multiple upcoming
hours (e.g. 36 hours or even more). Such a balancing
market would provide a repeated forward-looking price
discovery mechanism to help both the gas and electric
sectors to more efficiently coordinate their operations.

2.2. Gas Balancing Market
The proposed Gas Balancing Market (GBM) would
have voluntary participation and would be
administered by a pipeline specific market operator. It
would function as a two-sided auction conducted on
the gas pipeline network.
GBM transactions occur at network nodes that are
primarily custodial meters where gas changes hands,
compressor stations, and pipe interconnection points.
Network edges are the pipes that physically connect
the nodes. Auction participants are buyers and sellers
of gas submitting price/quantity (P/Q) offers/bids to
sell/buy gas at network nodes. Their buy/sell positions
are primarily driven by the need to buy gas above the
ratable schedules or the desire to sell gas in excess of
ratable schedules. Thus, the same market participant
may act as a buyer in one hour and as a seller in
another hour. Ratable schedules would be based on
deliveries confirmed at the Timely or Evening
nomination cycles. In addition, the market would
allow participation of buyers and sellers who have no
day-ahead confirmed schedules or firm capacity rights.
Offers and bids are submitted with an hourly time
step for a multi-hour optimization horizon (e.g., 36
hours).
The Auctioneer’s objective function is to
maximize, over the optimization horizon, the market
surplus between accepted bids and offers less the costs
of running the pipeline by operating gas compressors.
The auction repeats periodically (e.g. every hour or
every several hours based on actual design) with the
start and end time of the optimization horizon shifting
along with the auction repeat time and continuously
transitioning from one gas day to another.
The optimization problem is formulated subject to
the dynamic transient pipeline flow equations and must
satisfy key engineering constraints. The latter are
limitations on the maximum allowed operating
pressure at each pipe, minimum pressure requirements
at each node, horsepower limitations and compression
ratios of compressors.
The outcome of the auction includes:
• Hourly schedules for receipt and deliveries of
natural gas over the optimization horizon for each
buyer and seller and for each node of the network.
These schedules are the net results of ratable
schedules and buy/sell positions cleared in the
market;
• Hourly shadow prices of nodal mass balance
equations referred to as Locational Trade Values
(LTVs) of natural gas;
• Operational compressor setting and compression
ratios for each compressor station;

Page 3629

•

Pressure dynamics at pipes and nodes.
Market clearing for the first hour of the optimization
horizon will be ex post to actual deliveries in that hour.
Market clearings for all subsequent hours of that
horizon will be ex ante.
All cleared positions for all hours of the optimization
horizon will be financially binding.
These market results will be financially binding, thus
giving gas buyers and sellers assurance of obtaining
needed gas or liquidating any excess supply at a price
that is acceptable and known ahead of the delivery.
Since the market is cleared multiple times for the same
period, future uncertainties are resolved. This is
because the positions taken in earlier instances of the
GBM could be liquidated later if necessary or
desirable. In sum, the proposed market structure will
provide a transparent and efficient mechanism for near
real-time gas trading and corresponding gas price
discovery.
The proposed GBM timing is aligned with
nomination cycles that are in place for natural gas
pipelines in the United States. The first trading of a
particular GBM cycle is aligned with the completion of
the Evening Nomination Cycle (21:00 Central Time)
and would have an optimization horizon of 36 hours
which will cover the remaining portion of the current
gas day (from 21:00 to 09:00 of the following day) and
the entire gas day from 09:00 to 09:00 of the day that
follows. The next trading will occur at 22:00 and will
have an optimization horizon of 35 hours also ending
at 09:00 of the day after the following day.
Because the optimization is conducted subject to
the gas flow physics and engineering constraints,
market clearing assures feasibility of delivery
schedules identified. The underlying mathematical
formulation of the optimization problem behind GBM
is provided in [14].

2.3. Gas System Optimizer (GSO)
The study used our Gas System Optimizer (GSO)
model schematically depicted in Figure 1. GSO
implements transient optimization algorithms as
described in [12].

GSO optimizes the dynamic schedules and operation of
a natural gas pipeline network. GSO finds the optimal
pipeline flows and delivery schedules with the
concurrent operations of compressor stations and line
pack dynamics. In parallel, GSO determines the
economic value of natural gas at any point in time and
at any network location. For the purpose of this paper,
GSO is used to compute GBM problem solutions. The
inputs include the static network model and a
collection of time-dependent parameters. The static
network model contains specifications for the nodes,
pipes, and compressors on the system. In addition, we
specify gNodes, which represent sellers or offtakers of
gas on the system, more than one of which can
correspond to a physical network node. These can
represent any meter stations, and multiple gNodes can
be used to represent different price\quantity levels for
the same customer.
The temporal parameters for the GSO solver
include purchases, sales, bid and offer prices, flows
corresponding to pre-existing contracts, minimum and
maximum offtake curves of buyers, and minimum and
maximum supply curves as described above. The
temporal outputs are physical variables that include
discharge pressure, power, compression ratios, suction
and discharge pressure, and through flow for all
compressors on the system; cleared purchases and sales
for all customers participating in the market; nodal
pressures; and pressures and flows at each end of all
pipes in the system. In addition to the physical
solution, a market solution is provided that includes the
LTV at each node, as well as the dual variables
corresponding to constraints on compressor power and
discharge pressure.
To model rolling horizon based optimization, the
GSO tool can accept initial conditions to initialize the
problem and output the system state at any specified
time, so that it can be used to optimize the subsequent
rolling horizon optimization step.
While the
computational implementation of the GBM solution
requires elliptic (i.e. time-periodic) boundary
conditions, the real data that is used in our case study is
aperiodic. In order to apply the computational tool, for
each solve over a time horizon
, the problem is
solved over an extended time horizon
and
the solution is then restricted back to
. The
output state at time is subsequently used to initialize
the solution on the next time horizon
.

3. Computational Case Study
Figure 1. Gas Supply Optimizer

3.1 The Physical Dataset
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The computational case study discussed in this
section is based on data obtained from a planning
model of a pipeline system in the United States and
temporal SCADA data measured from the same system
during February and March of 2014, a period when
energy networks in the United States were particularly
stressed due to Polar Vortex conditions. The process
used to develop and validate the network model by
comparing simulations against SCADA measurements
is described in [9]. As explained in that paper, the
network model was simplified from a model used for
capacity planning, typically with steady-state
optimization. The simplification relied on several
assumptions.
First, passive components and
connections in the system such as valves were
removed, and their status (open/closed) was used to
determine any modifications to the topology. Second,
although multiple compressor units make up a
compressor station, the suction and discharge of the
entire station occur through common headers. Thus,
we modeled each compressor station as a single
aggregate compressor with an aggregate power and
assume that the individual compressor units can be
controlled locally to maintain the desired discharge
pressure of the entire station. The extracted subsystem
is illustrated in Figure 2, and consists of 78 model
nodes, 95 pipes with total length of 444.25 miles, and 4
compressor stations. Major inflow is at the suction of
compressor 1 and main outflow is from node X, with
smaller offtakes throughout the system and at laterals.
Inflow at compressor 1 and outflow at node X feed the
upstream and downstream portions of the same
pipeline, respectively. This network serves three
power plants located at nodes labelled E, H and Q.
For each pipe, the physical parameters used were
length, diameter, and friction factor, which were taken
directly from the pipeline planning model. However,
as explained in [9], the friction factor was scaled down
by an engineering factor of 0.85 to compensate for pipe
efficiency factors commonly used by commercial
software packages but not considered in the reduced
modeling approach.
The temporal network model consists of
measurements from the SCADA system used for
operation of the pipeline from which the test system
model was extracted. This system provides hourly
measurements of pressure (psig), temperature (degrees
F), and volumetric flow (mcfh) out of the system at 31
metered custody transfer meter and check
measurement locations, as well as average gas gravity
and thermal content (mBTU/mmscfd).
Check
measurements at the 4 compressor stations include
suction and discharge pressure (psig), suction and
discharge temperature (degrees F), and volumetric
through-flow (mcfh). Using this information, we

computed mass flow (mmscfd) at each reduced
network model location where flow leaves or enters the
system and pressure at the slack node.
The temporal quantities of interest for our analysis
in this paper are SCADA-based hourly incoming and
outgoing flows that, combined with publicly available
pricing information, we use to construct time
dependent bid and offer price/quantity pairs.

3.2 Economic Data and Assumptions
As explained in Sec. 2.2 and 2.3, hourly buy/sell
positions of buyer and sellers of natural gas within the
modeled footprint are required as inputs into the GBM.
At present, no statistical data of that kind exists. To
compensate for this, we made several assumptions.
First, we assumed that the only controllable supply is
located at the entry point of inflow into compressor 1,
which effectively represents all suppliers located
upstream of the footprint. To test the physical and
economic limitations of the modeled footprint, we
assumed that controllable supply is unlimited in
magnitude, up to engineering constraints at the inflow
location.
Second, we considered four controllable demand
locations – exit point X and three power plants at
points E, H and Q. For power plants, we assumed that
their demand for natural gas is capped at the level of
actual hourly deliveries. As explained in the next
section, depending on the experiment, the exit point
was modeled both as capped at actual gas deliveries or
as an unlimited gas buyer.
Depending on the experiment, we considered two sets
of pricing assumptions. To assess physical
deliverability of the system we assumed offer and bid
prices for controllable supply and demand that were
constant in time. Bid prices for all locations were set
above the offer price and equal for all locations. Under
this assumption, the GSO algorithm would maximize
total deliveries to controllable demand and make no
economic preference for individual delivery points.
For pricing and social welfare analyses described in
the next section, we assumed that upstream supply was
available at the corresponding regional pricing index
obtained from the S&P Global Market Intelligence
service (S&P Global).
For power plants, bids were based on ratios of
Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) at power plants’
pricing nodes divided by their respective full load heat
rates obtained from S&P Global. These bids change
hourly and effectively represent an estimate of power
plants’ willingness to pay for fuel given hourly prices
they receive for selling electricity.
For the downstream exit point, we used two pricing
points – the regional downstream price index applied
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to deliveries capped at the actual hourly level and an
hourly price for incremental deliveries above actual
levels. For incremental demand at the exit point under
the price was set similarly to power plants’ and based
on hourly LMPs at an electric trading hub in the area
served by the downstream portion of the pipeline. That
LMP is divided by a factor of 8.5 Mcf/MWh which is a
mid-point between a typical combined cycle power
plant and a combustion turbine generating unit. The
resulting bid approximates the hourly willingness to
pay by a representative gas-fired generating unit served
by a downstream pipeline segment.
Upstream and downstream natural gas pricing indices
were based on relevant pipeline trading hubs with
values obtained from S&P Global. These prices change
daily on weekdays only, prices for Friday apply also on
Saturday and Sunday.

3.3. Objectives and Design of Numerical
Experiments
The objectives of numerical experiments conducted
with the use GSO applied to the above described
dataset were to evaluate the potential effect of transient
optimization on physical natural gas deliverability, on
economic efficiency and to evaluate the relationship
between LTVs and regional day-ahead prices. To meet
these objectives, we conducted four experiments 1)
Physical Base Case (PBC); 2) Throughput
maximization (TM); 3) Economic Base Case (EBC)
and 4) Social Welfare maximization (SWM). All 4
cases share the same network model parameters and
hourly incoming and outgoing flow data. These cases
differ in terms of which flows are controllable by GSO
and the offer/bid values assigned to controllable flows.
An unlimited Controllable Supply was placed at the
upstream entry point in all four cases. Offer prices at
the upstream entry point were set as shown in the table
below:
PBC
$2/Mcf

TM
$2/Mcf

EBC
Upstream
zone index

SWM
Upstream
zone index

Demand bids were placed at the downstream exit
point and at three locations serving power plants. The
maximum controllable demand for power plants was
set in each hour matching their actual hourly gas use.
Under the PBC and EBC cases, controllable demand
for the exit point was set at actual hourly out-flows.
Under the TM and SWM cases, controllable demand at
the exit point was doubled in size.
Bid prices for controllable demand were defined as
specified in the table below

PBC
TM
Power Plants
$3/Mcf
$3/Mcf
Downstream Exit Point
$3/Mcf
$3/Mcf

EBC

SWM

LMP/HR

LMP/HR

Downstream
zone index

LMP/8.5

In all four cases, GSO was set to maximize social
welfare. In the PBC and TM cases, buyers were
willing to pay $3/Mcf and a single seller was offering
unlimited supply at $2/Mcf. Selecting such parameters
guarantees that the system would maximize the
throughput effectively measured at a $1/Mcf spread
between buyers’ bid seller’s offer. In the EBC and
SWM cases, and social welfare maximization was
made sensitive to market prices reflective of relative
values placed on natural gas supply and electricity
demand during the two-month period of February and
March of 2014.
The purpose of the PBC Case was to set up a
comparison point against which to measure the effect
of the transient optimization under the TM case. At the
same time, we use the output of the PBC case to assess
the reasonableness of the optimization model against
SCADA data.
Indeed, unlike the benchmarking
performed in [9] where simulations relied on actual
compressor setting, in the PBC case compressor
operations are established by GSO and are unlikely to
match actual compressor settings used. However, it is
important to compare optimization results to actual
data to verify that optimized results are reasonable.
The results of such comparisons are illustrated in
Figure 3 for February 2014. The figure depicts hourly
discharge compressor pressure values computed by
GSO compared with SCADA measurements, and
confirms that simulated values are within the range of
observed values. Comparisons made for March of
2014, not presented here, also support that conclusion.
The purpose of the TM experiment was to find the
maximum realizable throughput in the same pipeline
segment over and above actually realized demand.
The objective of the EBC experiment was to compute
Locational Trade Values (LTVs) associated with the
Base Case flow regime by using the observed pricing
data. Once the LTVs were obtained, it became
possible to estimate an associated social welfare.
The objective of the SWM case was to maximize the
throughput at the time of need. The need is reflected in
the value of incremental demand based on the
approximated willingness of downstream electric
generators to pay for gas supplies. That was in contrast
to the TM case in which the throughput was
maximized assuming that it was always needed. In
addition, under the SWM case we directly assessed the
social welfare of the gas supply system under study,
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compared it to the social welfare estimated under the
EBC case and thus obtained the economic effect of the
GBM mechanism based on transient optimization
techniques.
In our rolling horizon modeling, we optimized the
system for a 48-hour horizon with a 24-hour
periodicity. System conditions were equalized at the
beginning of the first and at the end of the last
optimization hour and the state of the system was
unloaded at the end of the 24th hour of the optimization
horizon. That system state was used as an initial
condition for modeling the subsequent 48-hour
horizon. The 24-hour periodicity reflects the daily
decision cycle. Selection of the 48-hour optimization
horizon is a reasonable assumption reflecting the
difficulty for power plants to estimate their willingness
to pay for gas over a longer horizon.

Figure 4. Daily Effect to Throughput Optimization
(Feb-2014)

4. Analysis and Economic Implications
A comparison of simulation results under the four
cases described in the previous section are summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1. Estimated Effects of GBM using Transient
Pipeline Optimization
Throughput increase
TM – PBC
SWM – EBC
Price reduction at exit
point (EBC)
Increase in Social
Welfare (SWM – EBC)

February 2014

March 2014

12%
7%
28%

14%
9%
14%

8%

7%

As presented in that Table, using transient optimization
methods have the potential to increase pipeline
throughput by 12% - 14% at the time of significantly
constrained operations such as those under the Polar
Vortex conditions during the winter of 2014. The daily
and hourly throughput comparison between the PBC
and TM cases for February 2014 are shown in Fig. 4
and Fig. 5, respectively. Results for March 2014,
although not shown, look similar and confirm the
above conclusion.
Hourly and daily delivery dynamics shown in these
two figures indicate that the maximum achievable
throughput changes over time. Although maximized
deliveries are reflective of system capacity, the latter
appears to be dependent on system conditions.

Figure 5. Hourly Effect
Optimization (Feb-2014)

of

Throughput

As one would expect, optimized incremental deliveries
appear to be bigger in magnitude at the time of lower
deliveries under the PCB case. This observation
indicates that incremental throughput may appear at
times when it is not needed and the 12% - 14%
increase in throughput may be overstating the
economic effect of transient optimization.
The EBC and SWM cases designed to address these
concerns indicate that the magnitude of the incremental
throughput at the time of need is in the range of
between 7% and 9%. The need here is measured in
terms of the estimated willingness of power generators
located downstream to pay for gas relative to the gas
supplier offer price.
The 7% - 9% effect is smaller than under the TM –
PBC comparison, but is still very significant
considering that it is measured under extremely
constrained historical operational conditions.
We estimate a 7% - 8% increase in social welfare of
the operation of the pipeline segment under study
attributable to the modeled implementation of GBM.
By analyzing LTV values under the EBC scenario
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shown daily in Fig. 6 and hourly in Fig. 7. This
comparison indicates that using GBM-based LTVs as a
pricing mechanism for natural gas could have
significantly reduced natural gas prices to consumers
and at the same time electricity production costs and
resulting electricity prices. The noted difference
between the zonal price index and LTVs indicates that
most of the time, LTV serves as price cap – that is
particularly visible in Figure 7. On any day, under the
EBC scenario flows are constrained only in a few
hours at most. As a result, only in these hours LTVs hit
the price cap. The magnitude of price reduction in
March appears much smaller than in February. This is
simply because that March prices were less volatile
than in February resulting in lower average price
differences.

Figure 6. LTV vs. Downstream Price Index - Daily
Comparison

Figure 7. LTV vs. Downstream Price Index, Hourly
Comparison
The above analyses are performed under
intentionally narrow but realistic assumptions,
constrained by the economic data available. As a
result, we considered a very narrow application of the

GBM limited to a very few locations on the pipeline
system – an entry point, an exit point and three power
plant locations.
No flexibility and trading
opportunities were assumed for supply and deliveries
for all other points due to the lack of underlying
economic data. Our conjecture is that the effect of the
GBM based on transient pipeline optimization may be
significantly bigger if the scope of market participants
was more broadly spanned over the pipeline network
resulting in greater elasticity of supply and demand in
the system.

5. Conclusions
The focus of this paper was to review the Gas
Balancing Market (GBM) design and present a case
study based on historical data of a pipeline subsystem
in the United States. The proposed GBM is structured
to complement the timing and logic of the existing US
natural gas markets. It is specifically designed to
operate in the time period when there is no other
formal market mechanism. The goal of the GBM is to
improve the economic and operating efficiencies of
both the natural gas and the electric markets. The fact
that the GBM follows the standard gas day market and
is a voluntary, platform-based bilateral market means
that the GBM requires no changes in today’s
operational markets and may not require more than
standard market oversight, i.e., is not likely to require
FERC approval for its establishment.
The economic implications of the establishment of a
GBM are significant as discussed in Section 4. In the
case study presented for a real pipeline subsystem we
show that at a time of constrained delivery capability
because of extreme weather conditions, the GBM
structure would have allowed for an increase in natural
gas throughput of 12% to 14%. The impact on the
electric market during this time period would have
been a decrease in cost natural gas costs as a fuel for
electric generation of 14% to 28%, with an effect on
electricity prices of the same order of magnitude.
The GBM is proposed to operate on a pipeline by
pipeline basis or potentially begin with operation on a
constrained segment or end of a pipeline. As a result,
the GBM would explicitly not require any type of
regional organization to coordinate its operations. A
GBM could be instituted at a single pipeline level and
could also be set to serve only a part of the pipeline
system, to simplify an initial implementation.
Participation in the GBM would be entirely
voluntary.
The bilateral, auction-based structure
provides the opportunity of participation and additional
revenue through the clearing mechanism but is not
obligatory relative either to the physical operation of
the pipeline or of the economic benefits that can
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accrue. Participants will enter and leave, buy and sell
if and when the benefits of participation exceed the
costs of participation.
Participation in the GBM offers benefits to
market participats both on the gas side and on the
electric side. On the gas side, the GBM will provide
relief of pipeline constraints through LTV-sensitive
optimization of compressors helping to determine the
most efficient line pack strategy over time and across
the system to assure higher delivery to locations with
the highest value of gas. At the same time, redispatch
of electric generation in response to dynamically
formed LTVs will provide additional relief of pipeline
constraints.
In the long run we have shown that the creation of
the GBM will help the pipeline and their customers
make better operating and investment decisions.

6. References
[1] “Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order
#787,” www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20131115164637RM13-17-000.pdf.
[2]
“Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
order #809,”http://www.ferc.gov/whatsnew/commmeet/2015 /041615/M-1.pdf
[3]
MITEI. (2013) Growing concerns, possible
solutions:
The interdependency of natural gas and electricity systems.
[Online]. Available: http://mitei.mit.edu/publications/
reports-studies/growing-concerns-possible-solutions
[4]
E. Litvinov, “Design and operation of the
locational marginal prices-based electricity markets,”
Generation, Transmission Distribution, IET, vol. 4, no. 2, pp.
315–323, February 2010.
[5]
Forward Market Operations, “Energy & Ancillary
Services Market Operations, M-11 Rev. 75,” PJM, Tech.
Rep., 2015.

[6]
A. Rudkevich, and A. Zlotnik. "Locational
Marginal Pricing of Natural Gas subject to Engineering
Constraints." Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, pp. 3092-3101, 2017
[7]
E. G. Read, B. J. Ring, S. R. Starkey, and W.
Pepper, “An LP-based market design for natural gas,” in
Handbook of networks in power systems II. Springer, 2012,
pp. 77–113.
[8] A. Zlotnik, A. Rudkevich, M. Vuffray, S. Misra,
“Dynamic Marginal pricing for Optimal Scheduling of
Natural Gas Supply and Delivery over a Pipeline Network,”
In preparation
[9] A. Zlotnik, A. Rudkevich, E. Goldis, P.A. Ruiz, M.
Caramanis, R. Carter, S. Backhaus, R. Tabors, R. Hornby, D.
Baldwin. “Economic Optimization of Intra-Day Pipeline
Flow Schedules using Transient Flow Models.” Proceedings
of the PSIG 2017 Conference, Atlanta, GA, May.
[10].
E. S. Menon, Gas pipeline hydraulics. CRC Press,
2005.
[11].
A. L. Lee, M. H. Gonzalez, and B. E. Eakin. "The
viscosity of natural gases." Journal of Petroleum Technology
vol. 18, no. 8, pp. 997-1000, 1966
[12].
A. Zlotnik, M. Chertkov, and S. Backhaus,
“Optimal control of transient flow in natural gas networks,”
in 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Osaka,
Japan, 2015, pp. 4563–4570.
[13].
A. Osiadacz. "Simulation of transient gas flows in
networks." International journal for numerical methods in
fluids 4.1 (1984): 13-24.
[14]. A. Rudkevich, A. Zlotnik, P. Ruiz, E. Goldis, R.
Tabors, R. Hornby, S. Backhaus, M. Caramanis, A. Beylin,
R. Philbrick. Market Based Intraday Coordination of Electric
and Natural Gas System Operation. In.: Proceedings of the
51st Hawaii International Conference on System Science,
2018.

Page 3635

Figure 2. Pipeline Network Diagram

Figure 3. Compressor Settings Simulated vs. Actual, February 2014
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